We test two hypotheses reflecting answers to the following questions: (1) Do manufacturing firms adopt advanced manufacturing initiatives and supply chain management initiatives in a complementary manner, consistent with a given set of product and process characteristics? and (2) If the adoptions of various advanced manufacturing initiatives and various supply chain management initiatives do represent complementary choices, in light of a given set of product and process characteristics, what performance consequences can be expected? The two hypotheses are derived based on the logic of complementarities from economics, the structural contingency perspective in organization theory, and the concept of "FIT" from strategic management and are empirically examined with secondary data from durable goods manufacturers. Results from applying the method of simultaneous equations and regression analyses indicate that manufacturing firms appear to make adoption decisions with respect to advanced manufacturing initiatives and supply chain management initiatives in a complementary manner and that the complementary nature of these choices (i.e., "FIT") improves manufacturing performance. Change decisions should, therefore, not be made in isolation without considering impact on "FIT" and performance. The overall empirical approach, moreover, demonstrates a "systems approach" to defining "FIT" and examining its implications.
INTRODUCTION
Improving manufacturing performance for sustainable competitive advantage has been and continues to be an ongoing concern for modern manufacturing. During the past two decades, a plethora of much-heralded advanced manufacturing initiatives and supply chain management initiatives -all of instances, these initiatives have been pursued by different functional constituents within the same manufacturing firm, but without widespread awareness of which function is doing what. Motivating these adoption decisions is the presumption that these initiatives, whether adopted sequentially or in parallel, would have complementary and beneficial performance effects.
If one were to survey this landscape, albeit in a somewhat superficial manner, one cannot help but question the logic (or lack of) behind these adoption decisions -not only in terms of the what initiatives to adopt but also in terms of which initiatives to adopt when. In other words, given that manufacturing firms respond to their customer requirements with a set of products and associated means to create these products (i.e., product and process characteristics), do they adopt advanced manufacturing initiatives and supply chain management initiatives in a rational and complementary manner, consistent with their response? An affirmative answer to this question would imply that the various advanced manufacturing initiatives and supply chain management initiatives have indeed been carefully evaluated and that their adoption decisions are jointly determined contingent upon the unique product and process characteristics of the firm and as to their overall effects on performance.
Moreover, one cannot help but question the validity of the presumption that these initiatives, when adopted, would have complementary, beneficial performance effects. In other words, if the adoptions of advanced manufacturing initiatives and supply chain management initiatives ideally represent rational and complementary choices, in light of a firm's product and process characteristics, what performance consequences can be expected? While the performance effects of individual and specific advanced manufacturing initiatives or supply chain management initiatives are well argued (e.g., Total Quality Management -see Hendricks & Singhal, 1997 ;Just-in-Time Manufacturing -see Sakakibara et al., 1997; etc.) , the performance impact of adopting multiple, with a few exceptions, has rarely been empirically investigated. Yet, many scholars (e.g., Milgrom & Roberts, 1995; Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990) would argue that it is the "FIT" among various adopted initiatives that matters.
In this paper, we seek to provide both theoretical clarity for and empirical insights into these two related issues. Borrowing the logic of complementarities from economics (Milgrom & Roberts, 1988 , VERSION: July 28, 2006 , the structural contingency perspective from organization theory (Chandler, 1962; Lawrence & Losch, 1969) , and the concept of "FIT" from strategic management (Venkatraman & Camillus, 1984; Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990) , we derive and empirically test two hypotheses, with the first hypothesis focusing on identifying empirical profiles reflecting the adoption choices of advanced manufacturing initiatives and supply chain management initiatives, given a set of product and process characteristics, and with the second hypothesis focusing on the "FIT"-performance consequences of these choices.
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Complementarities and "FIT"
Manufacturing firms have been engaged in a flurry of activities these past two decades, eagerly embracing many of the latest and often publicly-proclaimed "solutions" for creating and maintaining competitive advantage in the marketplace. No doubt, the constantly evolving emphasis from one initiative to another makes these adoption decisions look rather disorganized, short-term, and, as a result, builds little confidence in the leadership and management of the manufacturing sector.
Recent theoretical developments looking into the economics of modern manufacturing would, however, suggest otherwise. In a series of papers, Milgrom and Roberts (1988 developed and formalized the logic of complementarities in economic models of modern manufacturing firms that describe their observed characteristics, behavior, and performance. Accordingly, profit-maximizing manufacturing firms do not adopt technologies, methods, and groups of activities (i.e., what we refer to liberally as "initiatives") in an accidental and haphazard fashion that reflect ". . . small adjustments made independently at each of several margins . . ." (Milgrom & Roberts, 1990: 513) . Rather, modern manufacturing firms do so in a conscious and coordinated manner in order to exploit complementarities among various initiatives as part of the structuring and re-structuring of their response to customers in the external environment.
In fact, the logic of complementarities has already been alluded to, although not formally modeled, in both the manufacturing management and the supply chain management knowledge domains.
Empirical evidence reflecting and providing partial support for the logic of complementarities has also surfaced more recently in both literature domains to complement such advice. For example, Das and Narasimhan (2001) found that the pattern of investments in various manufacturing technologies (e.g., CAD, CAM, etc.), manufacturing management systems (e.g., Just-in-Time Kanban), and supply chain coordination technologies (e.g., EDI) differed between jobs shops and assembly lines. Also, Salvador, Forza, and Rungtusanatham (2002) reported that products embedding a component swapping modularity design have manufacturing task allocation decisions and sourcing configurations different from products embedding a combinatorial modularity design.
As such, one would expect a manufacturer who decides to compete in the market by offering greater product variety to adopt advanced manufacturing initiatives (e.g., quick changeover techniques)
and supply chain management initiatives (e.g., JIT deliveries from suppliers) that are complementary in optimizing flexibility and agility in its chosen production process. Conversely, a manufacturer who offers a standardized product in the market would choose to adopt advanced manufacturing initiatives (e.g., quality improvement techniques) and supply chain management initiatives (e.g., customer involvement in product design) that are complementary in optimizing a high-volume, defect-free production process.
The adoption choices that modern manufacturing firms make with respect to alternative forms of organizational design, advanced manufacturing initiatives, and supply chain management initiatives are, therefore, rational and, from a systems perspective, reflect an appreciation of how these choices closely interact with and jointly determine one another.
While it may be ideal to specify a priori the exact nature of the joint adoption of advanced manufacturing initiatives and supply chain management initiatives, contingent on a set of product and process characteristics, this could not be undertaken for two specific reasons. First, the multidimensional nature of these constructs, not unlike those in strategic management research (Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990) , makes the articulation of a complete and precise configuration of linkages extremely complex.
Second, even if the task were not overly complex, there is insufficient domain knowledge within manufacturing management and supply chain management to justify the theoretical and precise nature of any adoption patterns (Cua, McKone, & Schroeder, 2001 ).
In conclusion, the logic of complementarities in the context of modern manufacturing, along with the conceptual and limited empirical results in the manufacturing management and supply chain management domains, suggests the following Hypothesis 1:
H1:
For any given set of product and process characteristics, the adoption of advanced manufacturing initiatives and the adoption of supply chain management initiatives would be complementary and be jointly determined.
Performance Consequences of "FIT"
The logic of complementarities also implies that modern manufacturing firms would enhance performance when they can successfully exploit complementarities among the activities adopted in response to the external environment (Milgrom & Roberts, 1995: 186) . This performance implication has been more explicitly developed in organization theory and strategic management. Within organization theory, the "structural contingency theory" perspective posits the alignment between organization design and strategy as key to superior organizational effectiveness (Chandler, 1962; Lawrence & Losch, 1969) .
Strategic management, in turn, has borrowed from the "structural contingency theory" perspective to offer the concept of "FIT" and to argue its performance implications (Venkatraman & Camillus, 1984; Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990) . Accordingly, as conditions in the external environment vary, the firm should vary its response by developing, selecting, and adopting different strategies and initiatives so as to maintain both internal and external fit with these external environmental conditions (e.g., Kotha & Nair, 1995) -an argument generally referred to as the "FIT-performance" logic.
In the manufacturing management literature, the "FIT-performance" logic can be found embedded in the Product-Process Matrix (Hayes & Wheelwright, 1979) , with the congruencies between product life cycle stages and types of manufacturing process essentially representing ideal configurations (Doty & Glick, 1994) such that mismatches would lead to sub-optimal performance (Safizadeh et al, 1996; Devaraj, Hollingworth, & Schroeder, 2001 (Joshi, Kathuria, & Porth, 2003) . Moreover, in many prior studies, specific product or process characteristics that may explain manufacturing performance variance are often either ignored or simply controlled for during empirical testing.
In conclusion, the "FIT-performance" logic advocated in various disciplines, along with the limited empirical evidence to support this logic, leads to the suggestion of the following Hypothesis 2:
H2:
Manufacturing firms, wherein the adoption of advanced manufacturing initiatives and the adoption of supply chain management initiatives complement one another for a given set of product and process characteristics (i.e., where there is "FIT"), would have superior manufacturing performance compared to manufacturing firms, wherein the adoption of advanced manufacturing initiatives and the adoption of supply chain management initiatives do not complement one another for any given set of product and process characteristics (i.e., where there is no "FIT").
DATA SOURCE
For this study, we used secondary data from durable goods manufacturers, collected by 
TESTING HYPOTHESIS 1: COMPLEMENTARITIES IN MANUFACTURING
Measures
As a first and necessary step to test Hypothesis 1, relevant measures have to be derived from the data source for (a) product and process characteristics, (b) advanced manufacturing initiatives, and (c)
supply chain management initiatives, as well as empirical proxies for four control variables.
Product and Process
Characteristics. Product and process characteristics describe the nature of the primary products being provided by the plant and the manufacturing process responsible for fulfilling demand for these primary products. We culled four relevant variables from the secondary survey data source to serve as proxy measures for product and process characteristics:
1. Number of SKUs (SKU) is a proxy for the breath of the primary product line, with SKU defined and measured as the "number of stock-keeping units managed within the plant."
2. Volume (VOL) is a proxy for the production volume of the primary product manufactured by the plant, with VOL = 1 when the facility is primarily used for volume-based production (i.e., high volume) and VOL = 0 (i.e., low volume) otherwise.
3. FORECAST denotes the approach by which demand and customer order fulfillment for the primary product is satisfied, with FORECAST = 1 for a build-to-forecast approach and FORECAST = 0 otherwise.
Process (PROCESS)
denotes the type of manufacturing process deployed by the plant in manufacturing the primary product, with PROCESS = 1 for a line-flow manufacturing process and PROCESS = 0 otherwise.
Consistent with the Product-Process Matrix (Hayes & Wheelwright, 1979; Safizadeh et al., 1996) and with standard knowledge in production and operations management textbooks (e.g., Chase, Aquilano, & Jacobs, 1998), we would expect a plant manufacturing only a few SKUs to operate using a line-flow manufacturing process (i.e., PROCESS = 1) in a volume-based production environment (i.e., VOL = 1) to generally fulfill orders using a build-to-forecast approach (i.e., FORECAST = 1). Conversely, when a plant has responsibility for manufacturing many SKUs, we would expect the plant to produce in relatively lower volumes (i.e., VOL = 0), not to use a line-flow manufacturing process (i.e., PROCESS = 0), and not to be building to forecast (i.e., FORECAST = 0).
Advanced Manufacturing Initiatives.
In the IndustryWeek survey, subject firms were asked to assess the extent to which each of the twelve advanced manufacturing initiatives is implemented within the plant. For each initiative, a survey subject would select responses from one of three categories -No Implementation, Some Implementation, or Extensive Implementation. For the purpose of data reduction, a principal components analysis, using the latent trait approach of categorical factor analysis (see Bartholomew et al., 2002) , was applied to the responses for the twelve advanced manufacturing initiatives. From this analysis (see Table 1 for factor loadings), we retained two factors -AG_FLEX: Agility & Flexibility (eigenvalue > 3.71) and QUALITY: Quality & Process Improvement (eigenvalue > 1.48). Whereas the AG_FLEX factor appears to be associated with advanced manufacturing initiatives that relate to enhancing manufacturing agility and flexibility, the QUALITY factor, on the other hand, appears to be associated with advanced manufacturing initiatives that relate to ensuring manufacturing process and product quality. To accommodate subsequent analyses, the factor scores for AG_FLEX and QUALITY were computed using a simple component scoring mechanism.
----- INSERT TABLE 1 Latent trait, categorical factor analysis revealed two factors, one factor pertaining generally to
Supplier-Oriented Initiatives (SUPPLIER, eigenvalue > 3.29) and a second factor pertaining generally to
Customer-Oriented Initiatives (CUSTOMER, eigenvalue > 1.16) -see Table 2 . While the SUPPLIER factor appears to be associated with supply chain management initiatives that acknowledge activities performed by suppliers to support the manufacturer, the CUSTOMER factor appears to be associated with activities performed by customers to provide information to the manufacturer. Again, factor scores were then computed for each case in the sample to facilitate subsequent analyses.
-----INSERT Similarly, the choices of supply chain management initiatives can be affected by the number and values of items sourced from other entities within the supply chain, by negative economic conditions such as plant shutdowns, and by plant investments in information technology to support supply chain management initiatives. To control for these factors when examining the adoption of supply chain management initiatives, we used the percentage of cost of materials purchased to the total product cost as a proxy for the relative significance of purchasing spend (MATERIALS). Likewise, we used the question of whether or not the plant has experienced significant downsizing in the past five years as a proxy to control for the impact of downsizing (DOWNSIZE). Finally, a binary variable, SCM_INFO, is used to describe the extent of such supply chain related information technology investments, with SCM_INFO = 1 (High) and SCM_INFO = 0 (Low). Table 3 . (Milgrom & Roberts, 1995: 205) and, at the same time, highlight three interesting insights. First, these results provide rare empirical evidence for the Product-Process Matrix (Hayes & Wheelwright, 1979) , a configuration theory in production and operations management that ". . . has been widely accepted without empirical validation" (Devaraj, Hollingworth, & Schroeder, 2001: 428) . Specifically, consistent with the Product-Process Matrix, the results show that a product manufactured in high volumes would likely be paired with a line-flow manufacturing process, while a product with low volume requirements would not be produced using a line-flow manufacturing process.
Empirical Analyses
Second and more importantly, the systems equations results reveal four differentiated profiles that demonstrate and confirm empirically how manufacturing firms differ systematically in their adoption choices as conditioned by market requirements and constraints, which may also reflect differences in their competitive strategies. For example, the results from Equation [1a] show that manufacturing firms facing high product variety requirements would not use a line-flow manufacturing system so as to engage in low-volume production and would emphasize initiatives that enhance flexibility and agility while seeking to integrate tightly with the supply base. Manufacturing firms in such a profile would likely pursue mass customization as a competitive strategy (see Pine, 1993) . The results from Equation [1b] , on the other hand, identify manufacturing firms that produce a relatively standardized product or set of products using high volume, line-flow manufacturing systems and that, as a consequence, emphasize not only quality improvement initiatives but also initiatives that integrate customers into the firm. Consistent with this profile would likely be contract manufacturing firms like those in the high-technology sector who specialize in meeting customer design requirements and product quality specifications or those who are consciously abiding by any of the many Total Quality Management paradigms that advocate process stability and improvement and customer involvement (see Anderson, Rungtusanatham, & Schroeder, 1994) . Manufacturing firms identified by the results of Equation [2a] reveal yet another profile of adoption choices -one that emphasizes leveraging and integrating upstream suppliers while, at the same time, adopting initiatives that improve quality and also enhance flexibility and agility. These manufacturing firms, interestingly, are able to pursue adoption of these three sets of initiatives, irrespective of the characteristics of the products they offer and the processes used to produce these products. Such a profile would, therefore, typify manufacturing firms who have attained world-class or high-performance manufacturing status (Schonberger, 1986; Schroeder & Flynn, 2001 Equation [1b] in that their emphasis on quality improvement initiatives and customer-oriented initiatives but differ in that they subscribe to a build-to-order approach and tend not to use line-flow manufacturing systems to fulfill market orders. Such a profile would typify niche players who are high-end specialty manufacturers (e.g., subsystem suppliers to the automobile industry).
Third, while the logic of complementarities is intuitively appealing in describing and explaining how modern manufacturing firms should operate, there has not been much empirical evidence to validate this logic until now. Each of the four profiles revealed by the empirical analysis above shows a different but coherent pattern of joint adoption decisions with respect to advanced manufacturing initiatives and supply chain initiatives and how these choices are affected by the product and process characteristics of manufacturing firm. For example, because of differences in the values of the two underlying product and process characteristics of VOL and PROCESS, manufacturing firms in the profiles derived from 
TESTING HYPOTHESIS 2: FIT-PERFORMANCE
Measures
Because Hypothesis 2 effectively conjectures that performance outcomes -more specifically, manufacturing performance -would be better off when configurations of adopted advanced manufacturing initiatives and supply chain management initiatives fit a given set of product and process characteristics, testing this hypothesis requires that operational definitions for "FIT" and manufacturing performance be articulated.
5.1.1 "FIT" Indices. To operationalize "FIT" (see Table 4 ), we follow a two-step approach with the simultaneous equations method results in Table 3 . The resulting "FIT" indices, in essence, represent and capture succinctly the empirical profiles discussed in Section 4.2.3.
In
Step 1, since the four systems equations contain both binary variables (e.g., VOL) and continuous variables (e.g., AG_FLEX), and in order to maintain consistency across these variables in 
PROCESS FORECAST
This two-step approach is, therefore, consistent in spirit to the "systems approach" for defining "FIT" as a distance measure from a [multidimensional] profile (see Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985) .
-----INSERT TABLE 4 -----5.1.2 Measures of Manufacturing Performance. For manufacturing performance, metrics pertaining to changes in the last five years in terms of quality (ΔPass), manufacturing cycle time (∇Cycle_Time), delivery lead-time (∇Delivery), and per unit manufacturing costs (∇Unit_Cost) were identified from the Third Annual IndustryWeek Census. These four manufacturing performance metrics reflect the four objectives that are frequently used in defining a firm's manufacturing strategy (Hayes & Wheelwright, 1979; Schroeder, Anderson, & Cleveland, 1986) . In the census, these manufacturing performance metrics were defined as follows:
1. ΔPass = Percentage increase in finished product first-pass yield.
2. ∇Cycle_Time = Percentage decrease in cycle time. For all four metrics, plant informants were asked to select the interval corresponding to the observed % change -e.g., 21-40%. However, for testing Hypothesis 2, each interval value was converted into a single numerical value by taking the median of the interval (i.e., the selected interval of 21-40%
would, therefore, be converted into a single numerical value of 30.5%). IND_∇Unit_Cost, as such, can be interpreted in a similar manner.
Regression Analyses
Regression Models. To evaluate Hypothesis 2, four regression models (see Equations [3a] -
[3d]) are estimated, with each regression model assessing the impact of different "FIT" indices on a particular manufacturing performance metric. For ΔPass, the signs of the various "FIT" coefficients are expected to be positive (signaling improvement); for the remaining three manufacturing performance metrics, the signs for the various "FIT" coefficients are all expected to be negative (signaling improvement). Hypothesis 2 would be supported if the partial regression coefficients for the different "FIT" indices per manufacturing performance metric are statistically significant in the expected (positive or negative) directions. Table 5 reports the regression results. As expected, the industry average means for all four performance metrics are statistically significant, further justifying the need to control for them in testing for Hypothesis 2. More importantly, except for specific exceptions, the "FIT" indices are generally found to exert statistically significant (and sign-correct) effects on manufacturing performance. For example, with respect to output quality, or ΔPass, the results indicate that the "FIT" indices representing the empirical profiles consistent with the adoptions of the two advanced manufacturing initiatives and of the two supply chain management initiatives are associated with improvements in first-pass yield (ΔPass). For the remaining three manufacturing performance metrics, at least one "FIT" index appears to have a statistically significant and directionally-appropriate influence. With respect to cycle time and manufacturing cost, "FIT" with respect to the adoption of the SUPPLIER initiative appears to lead to significant reduction in cycle time (∇Cycle_Time) and in manufacturing cost per unit (∇Unit_Cost). Moreover, with the delivery lead time performance, "FIT" with respect to the adoption of the SUPPLIER initiative and "FIT" with respect to the AG_FLEX initiative both appear to significantly reduce delivery times (∇Delivery).
--- --INSERT TABLE 5 For the other three manufacturing performance metrics, the regression results in Table 5 (Panel A) show that at least one "FIT" index contributes positively to improving each of the three metrics, with economic improvement expected in the range of 3% and 9%. Therefore, if cycle time reduction (∇Cycle_Time) is of interest, a manufacturing firm should then pursue the profile corresponding to the adoption of Supplier-Oriented Initiatives (i.e., FIT_SUPPLIER = 1) since this would yield an improvement of approximately 9.0%. Similarly, for delivery lead time improvement (∇Delivery), interpretation of the regression results in Table 5 (Panel A) leads to a similar conclusion about the economic and improvement impact of FIT_AG_FLEX and FIT_SUPPLIER. Indeed, for delivery lead time performance, no less than 5.8% improvement can be expected, particularly if manufacturing firms were to pursue the profile suggested by FIT_SUPPLIER and adopt, as defined, initiatives that would enhance responsiveness (D_AF_FLEX = 1), quality (D_QUALITY = 1), and integration with upstream suppliers (D_SUPPLIER = 1). Similarly, in terms of unit manufacturing cost, Table 5 (Panel A) reveals that only FIT_SUPPLIER leads to a significant 3.2% reduction in ∇Unit_Cost. In other words, when manufacturing firms adopt the complementary initiatives that would enhance responsiveness (D_AF_FLEX = 1), quality (D_QUALITY = 1), and integration with upstream suppliers (D_SUPPLIER = 1), they can expect to improve their cost structure, and such improvement appears not to be constrained by product and process characteristics.
Yet another immediately obvious insight gleaned from Table 5 (Panel A) is the prevalence of the impact of FIT_SUPPLIER, the "FIT" index for Supplier-Oriented Initiatives, on manufacturing performance. Of the four "FIT" indices, only FIT_SUPPLIER appears to have statistically significant effects in terms of improving all four manufacturing performance metrics uniformly. This empirical finding should not be surprising given that FIT_SUPPLIER requires high adoption levels of advanced manufacturing initiatives that act both on quality (i.e., D_QUALITY = 1) and on timing (i.e., D_AG_FLEX = 1) and of supply chain management initiatives that also have implications for efficient response from the supply base (i.e., D_SUPPLIER = 1). Indeed, this empirical finding bolsters claims that world class manufacturing firms or high performance manufacturing firms can and should be able to avoid traditionally-noted tradeoffs in manufacturing performance (see Rosenzweig & Roth, 2004) . One can, therefore, conceivably argue that given constrained resources, if a manufacturing firm wishes to maximize manufacturing performance in terms of all four metrics, attention should be levied, without a doubt, on pursuing "FIT" with respect to Supplier-Oriented Initiatives.
Of the three remaining "FIT" indices, only FIT_AG_FLEX also appears to contribute statistically to two of the four manufacturing performance metrics -these being ΔPass -4.2% and ∇Delivery -4.8%.
Therefore, along the same reasoning, if quality and delivery lead time performance improvement were desired, manufacturing firms might want to pursue adoption of the initiatives underlying FIT_AG_FLEX, particularly if pursuing FIT_SUPPLIER is not deemed to be a viable or feasible option. 5.2.4 Sensitivity Analysis. One could, however, argue that the regression results (Table 5 , Panel A) are peculiar to the manner by which the "FIT" indices were constructed, raising a concern, therefore, as to the robustness of the regression results. To mitigate this concern, we repeat the regression analyses, after defining the "FIT" indices in a more stringent manner. Rather than converting AG_FLEX, QUALITY, SUPPLIER, CUSTOMER, and SKU into binary variables, we consider four quartiles such that the redefined variables can take on one of four values in the set {0, 1, 2, or 3}, with 3 denoting "high" and 0 denoting "low" correspondingly. We then set the "FIT" indices so that the values of the underlying profile dimensions are either in the top (= 3) or the bottom (= 0) quartile within the sample. For example, Table 5 . With the exceptions of ∇Cycle_Time and ∇Unit_Cost, the regression results are generally consistent and appear to be statistically stronger.
In the case of ∇Cycle_Time, the sensitivity analysis reveals that both FIT_SUPPLIER, noted earlier in Panel A of Table 5 , and FIT_AG_FLEX now appear to statistically and economically contribute to improving this metric, with improvement expected to be no less than 9.9%. Moreover, with
∇Unit_Cost, it appears from manufacturing firms characterized by intense market demand for greater product variety and meeting this challenge with small-volume production using job shop or batch processes, unit manufacturing cost can be significantly reduced (~ 6.0%) by complementing the adoption of initiatives that enhance responsiveness, agility, and flexibility with the adoption of initiatives that seek to integrate upstream suppliers.
SIGNIFICANCE, LIMITATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS
The Greek philosopher, Heraclitus (540 BC-480 BC), said quite eloquently that "Nothing endures but change. . . . There is nothing permanent except change." Such is the ultimate constant that all organizational entities, be they for-profit or non-profit firms in the manufacturing or service sectors, face;
for survival in the long-run mandates that organizations actively seek to evolve their responses to changing conditions in the environment and not take comfort in the status quo. Failing to do so or the unwillingness to do so (i.e., structural inertia) spells a certain doom (Hannan & Freeman, 1984) .
In the case of the for-profit manufacturing firm, to evolve is to offer new and innovative products to viable markets on an ongoing basis and to do so by pursuing efficient and effective processes and supply chains (Rungtusanatham & Forza, 2005) so that above-normal returns could be derived. Indeed, it is the very pursuit of improved processes and supply chains that appears to motivate adoption of various advanced manufacturing initiatives and various supply chain management initiatives -initiatives often acclaimed by the public media to be the panacea for all ailments.
Set against this context, the first question we ask in this paper is whether or not manufacturing firms actually succumb to and adopt "the initiative of the month" in a manner that defies the logic of complementarities embedded in economic models of modern manufacturing firms. A second question we ask in this paper, one that follows naturally from interest in the first question and that can be juxtaposed against arguments from the logic of complementarities, from structural contingency theory, and from the concept of "FIT," is what performance effects, if any, might there be when adoption decisions of various initiatives are not complementary -i.e., when there is no "FIT" among the adopted initiatives.
What we found in the empirical results to these two related questions are very encouraging. In fact, the empirical results for Hypothesis 1 (i.e., the first question), by affirming the logic of complementarities upon which Hypothesis 1 is based, preserve confidence not only in the sanctity of the extant knowledge in diverse literature streams that have called for increased attention to and highlighted the importance of within-organization and across-organization synergies but also in the leadership ability of modern manufacturing to evolve their respective firms for survival in a rational manner. As for the second question, the empirical results not only validate the arguments from the logic of complementarities, from structural contingency theory, and from the concept of "FIT" but also provide an alternative methodology for operationalizing the system concept of "FIT" and quantify the manufacturing performance improvement impact of "FIT" with respect to different advanced manufacturing initiatives and supply chain management initiatives. "FIT," simply stated, matters and modern manufacturing firms should embrace this perspective wholeheartedly as they move forward in evaluating new initiatives, regardless of their functional origins, and determining the extent to which an initiative, if adopted, would complement the existing profile of initiatives already in place and yield complementary performance benefits.
While we believe that the reported theoretical and empirical findings are insightful, no research is perfect. The research reported here, despite the attentiveness and rigor in the execution of research activities, is no exception, with the clear source of concerns being the nature of the data. First, since a trade association collected the data via a pen-and-paper questionnaire, the standards of survey design and administration that one would normally expect of scientific research may not have been upheld. A second related concern, albeit not critical, is the fact that the data had been collected for a different initial purpose
and, as such, may not be consistent with the objectives of this paper. However, this concern does not mean that secondary data sources cannot be fruitfully used in empirical research, as there is evidence to the contrary in strategic management (e.g., Miller & Chen, 1994) and in operations management (see Rungtusanatham et al., 2003: 481 -Table 5) . A third concern is the potential single-source bias that can arise from having the same informant responding to questions corresponding to independent variables and dependent variables (Crampton & Wagner, 1994) . How serious this concern may be can, however, be debated (Doty & Glick, 1984) .
Moving forward, an obvious research opportunity would be to reexamine and replicate the current study with primary data that would meet the standards of scientific scrutiny. Such reexamination and replication efforts are crucial to the development of scientific knowledge (Lykken, 1968 ) and, we are convinced, would lend credence to the empirical findings presented herein. In addition, as new initiatives in manufacturing management or in supply chain management become "discovered" and encouraged for adoption, the methodological approaches we followed in this paper can be redeployed to understand in a systematic fashion how these initiatives would (or would not) complement other initiatives as well as the beneficial (or detrimental) effects that adopting these initiatives may have on manufacturing performance.
Finally, in this paper, we focused only on manufacturing management and supply chain management initiatives as a consequence of data availability. There are nonetheless many other initiatives across different functional domains whose synergies (or lack of) can be and must be investigated in order to truly help any single organization to adapt and respond effectively to its ever-changing external environment. 
